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Abstract
Latent class analysis is applied to a hedonic price model to examine the presence of hetero-
geneity in consumer valuation of quality attributes in the Beninese rice market. Three classes
of consumers are found in proportions of 5, 56, and 39 percent. We employ a partial equi-
librium model and find modest gains in consumer surplus from an increase in head rice and
reduction in chalkiness. The results provide evidence of market sorting, which should be
taken into consideration in upgrading rice value chains. Also, it is important to assess poten-
tial gains from quality improvement to determine priorities for research and development.
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Introduction
African countries striving to achieve rice self-sufficiency have proposed and imple-
mented several interventions, particularly those aimed at narrowing yield gaps and
improving producer welfare. However, little attention has been paid to interventions
that would significantly improve consumer welfare. In many parts of Africa, consumers
perceive the quality of rice in their local markets to be poor. Therefore, even though an
increase in yield would certainly increase supply and consequently reduce prices, the
reduction in prices is unlikely to proportionately increase quantity consumed in
some countries owing to low price elasticities of demand such as those documented
in Tollens (2007), Ulimwengu and Ramadan (2009), Nzuma and Sarker (2010), and
Lazaro (2014). Instead, consumers may shift to the consumption of other foods since
the market lacks rice of the desired quality. This lack of rice of the desired quality is
partly due to the limited information on heterogeneity in consumer preferences that
characterizes rice markets. Without this information, upgrading of Africa’s rice value
chains will remain an uphill task.
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This study applies the hedonic pricing method, a revealed preference method
(Loureiro, McCluskey, and Mittelhammer 2003), to determine consumer preferences
for rice in Benin, where rice is the second most important cereal after maize. In
doing so, it accounts for market (consumer) sorting, failure of which would lead to
inconsistent parameter estimates (Gustafson, Lybbert, and Sumner 2016). Market sort-
ing arises from heterogeneity in consumer characteristics and preferences for quality
attributes; consumers self-select into searching for certain attributes, which leads to a
correlation between consumer characteristics and product attributes (Gustafson,
Lybbert, and Sumner 2016). In other words, consumers with similar socio-demographic
characteristics, constraints, and, hence, preferences are likely to make similar choices
(Kuminoff, Smith, and Timmins 2013). Danneels (1996) refers to this as reverse market
segmentation.1 Therefore, the analysis essentially involves the determination of differ-
ential hedonic prices, which can then be used by marketers to build product profiles
to more precisely and optimally target consumers and achieve greater market penetra-
tion. An exploratory case study by Futakuchi, Manful, and Sakurai (2013) revealed the
existence of heterogeneity in consumer preferences for rice attributes in Benin.
Additionally, ensuring that quality meets consumer demand is increasingly becom-
ing an integral part of breeding and crop improvement programs in Africa. As house-
hold incomes grow, it is expected that new breeding pipelines that include, for instance,
biofortified grain will emerge. Such crop improvement programs often require huge
public investments in research and development. But over the last decade, funding
for national and international agricultural research has been declining, making priority
setting based on rigorous impact assessment more imperative than ever before (Alene
et al. 2018). Therefore, this study goes a step further to determine the likely impacts of
grain quality improvement on consumer welfare.
Unlike Naseem et al. (2013) who applied a hedonic price model to Beninese con-
sumers’ subjective perceptions of rice quality attributes, our study applies a hedonic
price model to data obtained from laboratory tests of rice samples collected from dif-
ferent retail markets. The use of laboratory measures of quality, as in Unnevehr
(1986), Espinosa and Goodwin (1991), and Cuevas et al. (2016) rather than consumers’
and technicians’ sensory and semi-quantitative evaluation, provides comparatively reli-
able information on parameters relevant to the development of food products with sen-
sory attributes desired by consumers (Singham, Birwal, and Yadav 2015; Cuevas et al.
2016). Laboratory tests on rice samples were conducted for physical and chemical char-
acteristics associated with sensory attributes including appearance, aroma, texture, and
flavor that are thought to influence consumer acceptance of rice. The attributes were
then controlled for in a latent profile model to reveal the nature of hedonic prices of
the underlying classes of consumers.
In the next section, we review empirical literature on the application of hedonic pric-
ing to market sorting and to the determination of welfare impacts of quality improve-
ment. Hedonic price functions encompass both supply and demand factors, and
therefore, welfare changes accrue to both producers and consumers. However, the
review of literature is restricted to consumer welfare, the focus of our study. The
third section describes the economic model and the fourth section presents the data.
1An anonymous reviewer pointed out that the hedonic price model explicitly disallows the analysis of
market segmentation, but it is applicable to the analysis of market sorting. They indicated that the crucial
difference between the two is that market participants affect equilibrium prices in the case of market seg-
mentation but do not in market sorting.




















































































































This is followed by a discussion of the results in the fifth section. The last section sum-
marizes and concludes the article with implications for rice breeding and upgrading of
Africa’s rice value chains.
Related Literature
Market (Consumer) Sorting
Economists have devoted considerable effort to studying hedonic pricing of extrinsic
and intrinsic attributes of several goods such as foods, beverages, and houses. Rosen
(1974) intended that an empirical estimation of the hedonic price model involves esti-
mation of the market-clearing implicit (hedonic) price function in the first stage, and
the implicit marginal price function in the second stage. However, very rarely have
economists been able to move beyond the first-stage estimation of the model because
of theoretical and econometric challenges. The implicit marginal price function cannot
provide new information without restrictions on its functional form (Brown and Rosen
1982). It suffers from simultaneity in that consumers with a strong preference for a
given attribute will buy large quantities of products with this attribute (Bajari and
Benkard 2005). As such, heterogeneity in consumer preferences and consumer sorting
have been found to be serious problems for conventional hedonic price estimation
(Klaiber and Phaneuf 2009; Gustafson, Lybbert, and Sumner 2016), which assumes
that consumers manifest homogeneous preferences (Nagler et al. 2012). To overcome
these problems, a variety of techniques—some of which have been compared with
the hedonic model—have been employed in the empirical literature. For instance,
Klaiber and Phaneuf (2009) compare estimates of hedonic and sorting models using
residential sales and land-use data for east central Minnesota. Their sorting models
are essentially random utility model specifications with and without observed heteroge-
neity and are implemented as in Bayer and Timmins (2007). The models yield similar
results for some but not all variables. It is evident that the relatively high-resolution
analysis achieved with sorting models comes at a cost of greater complexity in terms
of data needs and theoretical assumptions. Gustafson, Lybbert, and Sumner (2016)
deal with consumer sorting in the American wine market by integrating consumers’
uninfluenced initial choice of wine purchase with their willingness to pay (WTP) for
alternate wines in a valuation experiment. They estimate and compare two models: a
typical hedonic price model (for all wines in the experiment) and a model in which
WTP rather than actual wine price is the dependent variable. The WTP model is esti-
mated in three forms: one with the same wine attributes as the hedonic model but with
the addition of a dummy variable for the initially chosen wine; a model with wine attri-
butes, a dummy for initially chosen wine and consumer characteristics; and a model
with wine attributes, a dummy for initially chosen wine and a dummy for individual-
specific fixed effects to account for sorting and unobserved consumer characteristics.
Valuation estimates for wine attributes are found to vary significantly between the
two approaches, and the model accounting for sorting and omitted consumer charac-
teristics provides the most precise estimates of aggregate WTP for wine attributes.
Bento, Li, and Roth (2012) use the random coefficients multinomial logit model to
incorporate consumer heterogeneity and avoid sorting bias in estimating U.S. consum-
ers’ marginal WTP for future reductions in fuel costs.
While the above studies use the random utility framework to explicitly account for
the parameters upon which market sorting is based, our concern is how to analyze mar-
ket sorting using a hedonic pricing model when there are several unknowns, including




















































































































the exact functional form of the model, the number of consumer categories, the con-
sumer characteristics defining those categories, and the full vector of the relevant
hedonic attributes. For example, regarding unknown hedonic attributes, Beninese con-
sumers’ valuation of rice attributes may partly depend on the type of rice dish (djolof
rice, white rice with soup, whatche, porridge, and dough) they desire for a given meal
(breakfast, lunch, and dinner), and occasion (religious holidays and social events). This
implies that some of the observed rice attributes may simply be proxy indicators of the
levels of relevant attributes not directly observed by consumers and perhaps unknown
to the analyst. Nagler et al. (2012) demonstrate how a hedonic price model of market
sorting can be applied to determine, for different categories of consumers, the gap
between marginal WTP for a proxy attribute and marginal WTP for the attribute it rep-
resents. The authors observed the levels of the latter attribute from laboratory analysis of
the products.
The present study adds to the empirical literature on market sorting by estimating a
hedonic price function as a finite mixture linear regression model, which is robust for
detecting differential effects when the number of consumer classes and predictors of
class membership is not specified a priori, when the predictors are unreliable, and
when the process that creates classes is complex, such as one involving multiple predic-
tors that interact in multiple ways (Van Horn et al. 2015). A similar approach has been
used by Shiroya (2010) to understand household residential sorting patterns in Texas.
More recently, Caudill and Mixon (2016) have applied the finite mixture model to a
hedonic model of California and Washington wine prices to demonstrate its superiority
over the Local Polynomial Regression Clustering (LPRC) procedure introduced by
Costanigro, Mittelhammer, and McCluskey (2009). They find it to have better aggregate
out-of-sample performance than the LPRC model.
Welfare Measurement
Conceptually, the measure of change in consumer welfare due to a change in a quality
attribute is a measure of change in the consumer’s utility. However, because utility is
unobservable, a change in consumer welfare is often measured by a monetary measure
of the consumer’s own valuation of the change in their welfare. An example is the
Hicksian compensating measure in the form of the maximum amount of money that
the consumer is willing to pay to achieve the change, in the case of an improvement
in quality, or the minimum amount that they are willing to accept to endure the change,
in the case of a decline in quality (Day 2001).
Measurement of welfare effects due to changes in quality characteristics remains
scarce in the empirical hedonic pricing literature. Palmquist (1988) attributes the scar-
city to the complexity of analyzing welfare when hedonic price schedules are nonlinear.
He proposes a technique for deriving exact measures of consumer welfare in a way that
accounts for the nonparametric nature of prices. Still, the practice seems to have
remained that of using implicit marginal prices as direct measures of welfare benefits
since they represent the WTP for a marginal change in an attribute (see, for instance,
Kim, Phipps, and Anselin 2003). Harrison and Rubinfeld (1978) and Chattopadhyay
(2002) use implicit marginal price functions (employed in the second-stage regression
of Rosen’s (1974) procedure) to obtain estimates of household benefits from nonmar-
ginal improvement in quality attributes in the housing market.
Hedonic estimates of marginal WTP can be used to derive partial equilibrium wel-
fare effects (Kuminoff and Pope 2009) as demonstrated by Unnevehr (1986) and Voon




















































































































wand Edwards (1991). Unnevehr (1986) estimates hedonic prices and calculates changes
in consumer surplus (CS) due to an improvement in rice grain quality in three Asian
countries. The method is intuitive and, hence, provides an appropriate framework for
the current study. On the contrary, Voon and Edwards (1991) apply a hedonic price esti-
mate obtained from the literature to determine the economic benefits to producers, input
suppliers, marketers, and consumers of reducing backfat depth in Australian pork.
Economic Model
The hedonic price regression can be traced back to at least Court (1938). Unlike the
traditional theory of consumer demand in which goods are the direct objects of utility,
the theory of hedonic pricing is based on the notion that utility is, in fact, derived, not
from goods per se but from their hedonic attributes. Rosen (1974) derives a model of
product differentiation in a competitive market and provides an interpretation of the
estimated hedonic (implicit) prices. Assume a market of differentiated products that
are characterized by n attributes, z1, …, zn. It is assumed that consumers have the
same perception of the quantity of attributes in each product. Each product has an
observed market price such that p(z) = p(z1, …, zn). Rosen then derives consumption
and production decisions and shows that in equilibrium, the implicit price function
p(z) represents a joint envelope of a buyer’s value function and seller’s offer function.
Later, Ladd and Suvannunt (1976) derive the consumer goods characteristics model
based on assumptions that specifically define the behavior of individual consumers. In
this model, a product’s observed market price is a weighted linear combination of the prod-
uct’s attributes, where each weight is the marginal implicit price of an attribute. Suppose Z0j
is the total quantity of attribute j provided by all products consumed, Zij is the quantity of
attribute j provided by one unit of product i, Z0m+i is the quantity of unique attribute m
provided by product i, qi is the quantity consumed of product i, and I is income. Therefore,
Z0j = fi(q1, . . . , qn; Z1j, . . . , Znj) and Z0m+i = fm+i(qi; Zim+i) (1)
The consumer maximizes
U = U(Z01, . . . , Z0m; Z0m+1, . . . , Z0m+n) (2)
subject to ∑
i





(∂Z0j/∂qi)[(∂U/∂Z0j)/(∂U/∂I)] + (∂Z0m+i/∂qi)[(∂U/∂Z0m+i)/(∂U/∂I)] (4)
The term in the first square brackets is the marginal rate of substitution between
income (or expenditure according to equation 3) and attribute j. It is the marginal




























































































































where E is the total expenditure on all products and (δZ0j/δqi) is the marginal yield of
attribute j by product i. Thus, equation 4 implies that the observed market price of a
product is equal to the sum of the marginal values of the attributes, where each attri-
bute’s marginal value is the quantity of the attribute per marginal unit of the product
(i.e., yield) multiplied by the attribute’s hedonic price. Equation 4 is the implicit




pijZij + u (6)
where the coefficients pij are the hedonic or implicit marginal prices of attributes, which
can be interpreted as the marginal WTP for a change in the attributes since they encap-
sulate consumers’ preferences (Nerlove 1995; Costanigro, McCluskey, and
Mittelhammer 2007), and u is the random error term. If an additive intercept is
added to equation 6, the coefficients can be interpreted as premiums or discounts
over a base price defined by the intercept.
To analyze market sorting, we apply latent class (LC) analysis to equation 5. LC anal-
ysis is a set of techniques used to model situations in which the observed data are com-
prised of a finite number of distinct classes (subgroups), but class membership is not
directly observed (Canette 2018). LC models permit disaggregation of a sample into
existing latent classes using one or more observed dependent variables, which may
be categorical or continuous.2 In this study, we apply a finite mixture linear regression
model,3 a type of LC maximum-likelihood-based model derived from a mixture of
underlying distributions, and use one dependent variable (Greene 2008, p. 558;
Costanigro, Mittelhammer, and McCluskey 2009; Canette 2018).
Following Greene (2008, p. 559), if a population consists of a mixture of two under-
lying normal distributions,4 the contribution to the likelihood function for individuals
or products in classes 1 and 2 is, respectively,
f (yi|classi = 1) = N[m1, s21] (7)
f (yi|classi = 2) = N[m2, s22] (8)
where yi is the outcome variable for individual or product i. Assuming that the propor-
tion of individuals or products in class 1 is Prob(classi = 1) and those in class 2 is
2When the observed variable is continuous, the model is referred to as a latent profile model.
3In the context of this study, an anonymous reviewer pointed out that this model can be better viewed as
functional approximation consistent on a single hedonic model under market sorting. Since the probability
of belonging to any class is totally random (does not depend on any consumer characteristic), this does not
violate the hedonic model assumptions because consumers will in this case not affect equilibrium prices.
After estimation, one may relate the class prices to consumer characteristics such as income if needed to
ascertain why and how they sort themselves. For this study, however, we did not collect data on consumer
characteristics.
4The model is applicable to cases where dependent variables might follow other types of distributions
such as the log-normal distribution in the case of prices (since prices take on only positive real values).
However, the logarithm of a log-normally distributed variable is normally distributed.




















































































































(1− Prob(classi = 1)), and zi is the vector of variables (attributes) that might explain
class probabilities, then the conditional density for product i is












The usual logit model can be used to parameterize the probabilities. The
log-likelihood, in this case, features two random variables; the outcome variable yi
and classi. For the more general case of K classes, the finite mixture model for variable
yi can be specified as
f (yi|classi = k, zi) = hk(yi, zi, gk) (10)
where hk is the density conditioned on class k, zi is a vector of covariates, and γk is the
kth parameter vector. However, even if it is impossible to conjecture the classes present
in the sample, as is the case in this study, the model remains amenable to estimation as
illustrated by Canette (2018).
Estimated hedonic prices can be used to calculate the change in CS due to a non-
marginal improvement in attributes. As in Unnevehr (1986), we use a partial equilib-
rium model to this end. Improvement in a quality attribute causes a rightward shift
in demand, and the gain, G, in CS per unit of the product consumed by a given




(Z∗ij − Zij)pij (11)
where Z∗ij is the new value of attribute j per unit of the product and pij is the estimated
hedonic price for a given class of consumers. At the aggregate level, assuming the infi-
nitely elastic supply of the improved product and constant production costs, the level of
demand for the product after quality improvement, q∗i , is








is the elasticity of quantity consumed of the product with respect to the quantity of
attribute j, and ε* is the own-price elasticity of demand for product i. These assump-
tions do not permit gain in producer surplus. The total gain in CS is
CS = qiG+ 12 (q
∗
i − qi)G (14)




















































































































Unlike in Unnevehr (1986), our study requires an estimate of ε* for each class of
consumers. However, we do not have the necessary data to empirically obtain estimates
of it, and turning to the literature, we find a paucity of empirical studies that have esti-
mated ε* for rice in Benin. For all we know, the recent study by Codjo (2019) has been
the only attempt to estimate the parameter; he estimates ε* for three income groups
(low, middle, and high) and three levels of rice quality and finds it to range between
−0.91 and −2.69. Therefore, we use the average of Codjo’s (2019) estimates, and we
conduct a sensitivity analysis for the relevant consumer classes in order to ascertain
the robustness of our model’s results.
Data and Estimation
In a study like this that aims to generate aggregate demand and CS based on sample
data, ensuring that the sample is representative of the population is imperative. At
the time of this study, a list of all rice retailers in the country and the types or brands
of rice they sell was unavailable. Moreover, the cost of obtaining it and collecting sam-
ples from retailers who are dispersed throughout the country would have been prohib-
itive. Nonetheless, we were able to obtain rice samples representative of the rice
consumed in the country’s four official geopolitical and cultural regions, namely
Northeast, Northwest, Central, and South. For each region, a list of all food markets
was obtained, from which a random sample of markets was drawn. The number of mar-
kets randomly selected from each region was proportional to the region’s share of mar-
kets in the country. Thus, a total of 33 markets were randomly selected: South (20),
Central (4), Northwest (6), and Northeast (3). In each market, rice retailers and the
type(s) of rice they sell were identified, and rice samples randomly collected. Only
one sample per rice type or brand was obtained from each selected retailer. A total
of 316 rice samples, which is adequate for our finite mixture model (Van Horn et al.
2015), was obtained: South (176), Central (35), Northwest (64), and Northeast (41).
The distance of each market (in km) from the Cotonou port was recorded. The
Northeast and Northwest of Benin are about 800–1,000 km from Cotonou port, and
the populations there have a history of rice cultivation. The Northeast is the most
important rice-producing region in Benin and harbors one of the country’s rice sector
development hubs5—Malanville. The Central region is about 300–500 km from
Cotonou port and harbors the other rice hub, Glazoue. Unlike Malanville, which is irri-
gated, the Glazoue hub is rainfed. The South is close (<300 km) to Cotonou port and is
home to Cotonou city, the largest city in Benin, and to Porto-Novo, the country’s polit-
ical capital. Most of the inhabitants of this region do not have a rice cultivation history.
A detailed description of the grain quality analysis that produced data on the attri-
butes used in the hedonic pricing model is available from the authors on request, and
summary statistics of the physical (extrinsic) and chemical (cooking) attributes used in
the model are presented in Table 1. Extrinsic attributes include moisture content, head
rice (proportion of intact grains), length–width ratio (grain shape), chalkiness (white
belly/opaque portion of a rice grain), lightness/whiteness, distance (km) of a market
from Cotonou port, market type (1 = rural, 0 = urban), rice type (1 = parboiled, 0 = non-
parboiled), and origin (1 = imported, 0 = local). A high moisture content of above 14
5Rice hubs are zones selected by the country’s rice value chain stakeholders and represent key rice-
growing environments where research outputs are integrated along the value chain to produce maximum
impact (Africa Rice Center 2011).




















































































































percent is undesirable as it leads to a deterioration of grain during storage (Tang et al.
2019). The distance of a market from the port, type of market, and origin of rice are
informational cues that may influence consumers’ perception of the quality of rice.
For instance, the type of market may account for ease of access to market and quality
information about the product, while the origin of a product may influence consumers’
perception of its quality (Elliott and Cameron 1994), in addition to capturing consum-
ers’ ethnocentric attitudes.
Chemical attributes include amylose content, setback viscosity, and alkali spreading
value (ASV). Amylose content determines the texture of cooked rice, whereby the
greater the amylose content, the drier, the less sticky, and less tender the rice is.
Setback viscosity, an indicator of the pasting quality of rice, determines the firmness
of cooked rice, with higher values indicating greater firmness after cooling. The ASV
is used to measure gelatinization temperature and, hence, cooking time. The higher
the ASV, the lower the gelatinization temperature and, hence, the shorter the cooking
time.
Results
The hedonic price finite mixture regression model was estimated in the form of a log-
linear (double-log) model,6 and Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) and Bayesian
Information Criterion (BIC) were used to determine the number of distinct consumer
classes present in the data. Both criteria found three classes, as shown in Table 2. We
find that about 5 percent of the observations are in class 1 that pays an average rice price
of $1.32/kg, while 56 percent are in class 2 with an average price of $0.89/kg, and 39
Table 1. Summary Statistics of Variables Used in the Analysis (n = 316)
Variable Mean St. Dev. Minimum Maximum
Price (USD/kg) 0.99 0.30 0.60 2.40
Moisture content (%) 13.25 0.86 10.90 16.80
Head rice (%) 84.35 13.45 20.43 100.00
Length–width ratio 3.10 0.36 2.26 4.36
Chalkiness (%) 14.61 10.51 2.54 43.69
Lightness (%) 59.73 7.52 41.55 73.58
ASV (index) 6.11 0.87 2.67 7.00
Setback viscosity (centipoise) 813.89 578.10 19.33 2,670.00
Amylose content (%) 26.47 3.97 13.18 37.36
Distance from port (km) 248.33 238.33 7.10 739.00
Market type (1 = rural, 0 = urban) 0.59 0.49 0 1
Rice type (1 = parboiled, 0 = white) 0.53 0.50 0 1
Origin (1 = imported, 0 = local) 0.73 0.45 0 1
6The double-log form provided the best fit to the data. Note that because of some dummy variables in
the model, it is not a completely double-log specification.




















































































































percent are in class 3 with an average price of $1.00/kg. Table 3 summarizes the results
of the three-class model. In a log-linear model, coefficients on continuous regressors are
elasticities, while those on discrete ones show the discontinuous effect on the regres-
sand. Therefore, we calculate and report hedonic prices of the statistically significant
attributes. The hedonic price of each continuous attribute is calculated as the product
of the attribute’s coefficient and the average price of rice divided by the average value of
the attribute, and it reflects the change in the market price of rice for a one-unit change
in the attribute. For a discrete attribute, however, the hedonic price is the effect on the
price of rice of one category relative to another. It is calculated as (eβ− 1), and the per-
centage effect is 100(eβ− 1), where β denotes the coefficient (Halvorsen and Palmquist
1980).
The smallest class (class 1) exhibits several unique characteristics: it is sensitive to all
but one attribute—moisture content—and it is willing to pay price premiums for the
relatively expensive imported rice and rice with chalkier grains, while discounting
rice with a relatively high proportion of intact grains (head rice), lighter grains (light-
ness), rice that becomes firm on cooling after cooking (setback viscosity), and rice sold
in markets far from the port of Cotonou. The other characteristics of this class, although
not unique to it, are that it likes rice with slender grains, nonsticky rice when cooked,
and shorter cooking time, and it discounts parboiled rice and rice sold in rural markets.
Taken together, these characteristics point to a category of consumers that is likely to be
comprised of relatively high-income consumers including foreign nationals in and
around major urban centers such as Cotonou city.
Classes 2 and 3 do not care for the origin of the rice they consume, a finding that is
contrary to that of Naseem et al. (2013), who concluded that rice consumers in Benin
prefer imported to local rice. Consumers in the largest class (class 2) are sensitive to
only five of the 12 attributes. They discount parboiled rice, rice sold in rural markets,
and rice with chalky grains, but are willing to pay price premiums for head rice and
amylose content. When comparing the hedonic prices in this class with those paid
by consumers in the other two classes, it is quite clear that consumers in class 2 exhibit
relatively weak preferences. For instance, they discount chalkiness by $0.006/kg, which
is only 30 percent of the discount paid by consumers in class 3, and parboiled rice by 32
percent ($0.21/kg) of the discount paid by consumers in class 1. For class 2, gain in
consumer welfare would likely come from a reduction in chalkiness, an increase in
head rice, and an increase in amylose content.
Consumers in class 3 are sensitive to half of the attributes. They are willing to pay the
same price premium for rice with a relatively high proportion of intact grains as con-
sumers in class 2. They like slender grains, lighter grains, and rice that cooks fast.
However, they discount rice with chalky grains and are the only class that discounts
Table 2. Results of Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) and Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) for Model
Selection
Number of classes Log-likelihood Degrees of freedom AIC BIC
1 134.40 14 −240.80 −188.22
2 205.51 29 −353.02 −244.10
3 254.39 44 −420.78 −255.53
4 258.57 53 −411.14 −212.09




















































































































Table 3. Estimated Regression Results of the Finite Mixture Model
Variable
Class 1 Class 2 Class 3
Coefficient z-Statistic p-Value
Hedonic
price Coefficient z-Statistic p-Value
Hedonic
price Coefficient z-Statistic p-Value
Hedonic
price
Moisture content 0.002 (0.003) 0.59 0.553 −0.203 (0.244) −0.83 0.406 0.229 (0.199) 1.15 0.249
Head rice −0.158 (0.0004) −421.53 0.000 −0.002 0.318 (0.107) 2.97 0.003 0.004 0.304 (0.053) 5.76 0.000 0.004
Length–width
ratio
0.051 (0.001) 49.37 0.000 0.02 0.073 (0.157) 0.47 0.641 1.272 (0.241) 5.27 0.000 0.41
Chalkiness 0.080 (0.0004) 180.29 0.000 0.005 −0.091 (0.042) −2.16 0.031 −0.006 −0.227 (0.044) −5.16 0.000 −0.02
Lightness −0.741 (0.001) −524.21 0.000 −0.01 −0.205 (0.311) −0.66 0.509 1.552 (0.386) 4.02 0.000 0.03
Alkali spreading
value
0.173 (0.0008) 225.82 0.000 0.03 0.045 (0.570) 0.80 0.425 0.435 (0.096) 4.52 0.000 0.07
Setback viscosity −0.037 (0.0001) −463.16 0.000 −0.00005 −0.011 (0.014) −0.77 0.442 0.011 (0.014) 0.78 0.435
Amylose content 0.108 (0.0005) 216.38 0.000 0.004 0.153 (0.085) 1.80 0.071 0.006 −0.420 (0.063) −6.69 0.000 −0.02
Distance from
port
−0.034 (0.0002) −156.01 0.000 −0.0001 0.016 (0.010) 1.61 0.107 0.009 (0.019) 0.45 0.653
Market type (0 =
urban)
−0.071 (0.0002) −407.12 0.000 −0.07 −0.036 (0.020) −1.79 0.073 −0.04 0.017 (0.036) 0.47 0.639
Rice type (0 =
white)
−1.061 (0.0004) −2,393.67 0.000 −0.65 −0.236 (0.059) −4.03 0.000 −0.21 −0.068 (0.054) −1.26 0.209
Origin (0 = local) 0.104 (0.006) 163.70 0.000 0.11 0.031 (0.040) 0.78 0.433 0.067 (0.045) 1.49 0.137
Constant 4.013 (0.014) 274.70 0.000 −0.492 (1.659) −0.30 0.767 −8.707 (1.217) −7.16 0.000
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rice that does not stick together when cooked. Also notable about this class is that it is
the only one that is indifferent about the type of market in which rice is sold. Based on
these characteristics, this category of consumers is likely comprised of periurban and
rural consumers, and it would gain from an increase in head rice and reduction in
chalkiness, among other things.
To determine the consumer welfare implications of grain quality improvement, we
consider improvement in two attributes whose coefficients are statistically significant
and of the same sign in classes 2 and 3. The two classes together comprise 95 percent
of the observations. We consider an increase in head rice by 30 percent and an
equivalent reduction in chalkiness. Both attributes can be improved upon through
breeding and better postharvest handling and processing. Parameters used in the partial
equilibrium model of quality improvement and the results obtained are summarized in
Tables 4 and 5, respectively.
We find that better head rice increases the demand for rice to 154,837 and
107,833 MT for classes 2 and 3, respectively. This represents a 55 percent increase in
demand by each class. A reduction in chalkiness causes demand to increase by 14
and 48 percent, in classes 2 and 3, respectively. The combined annual gains in CS
Table 4. Parameters Used in the Partial Equilibrium Model of Quality Improvement
Parameter Value
Current level of aggregate demand for rice by class 2 99,680a MT
Current level of aggregate demand for rice by class 3 69,420a MT
Current average price of rice $1.00/kg
Own-price elasticity of demand for rice −1.64b
Current level of head rice per unit of rice 84.35
Current level of chalkiness per unit of rice 14.61
New level of head rice per unit of rice after quality improvement 109.66
New level of chalkiness per unit of rice after quality improvement 10.23
Estimated hedonic price of head rice for class 2 $0.004/kg
Estimated hedonic price of head rice for class 3 $0.004/kg
Estimated hedonic price of chalkiness for class 2 −$0.006/kg
Estimated hedonic price of chalkiness for class 3 −$0.02/kg
Elasticity of quantity consumed of rice with respect to the quantity of head rice for
class 2
0.55
Elasticity of quantity consumed of rice with respect to the quantity of head rice for
class 3
0.55
Elasticity of quantity consumed of rice with respect to the quantity of chalkiness for
class 2
−0.14
Elasticity of quantity consumed of rice with respect to the quantity of chalkiness for
class 3
−0.48
aAggregate demand for rice in Benin was projected to reach 178,000 MT in 2018 (Republic of Benin 2011). We assume
demand by a consumer class to be proportional to the share of the class in the sample.
bSource: Authors’ calculation based on Codjo’s (2019) estimates.




















































































































for the two classes are $21,852 for head rice and $10,353 for chalkiness. Since this study
addresses a practical matter concerning upgrading rice value chains, it is important to
consider not only the direction of change in CS but also the magnitude of the change.
The gains in CS appear to be modest. A benefit–cost analysis would be informative in
assessing the feasibility of investment in quality improvement. However, an attempt to
determine the costs for Benin alone was met with difficulty. As has been observed in the
literature (see, for instance, Pardey et al. 2002), the matching of research benefits to
costs is a rampant problem, especially where collaborative research is involved and
information on costs is not clearly documented. Rice varietal improvement programs
in Africa have been led by the Africa Rice Center and the International Rice
Research Institute in collaboration with National Agricultural Research Institutes
such as the National Institute of Agricultural Research of Benin. The programs and
their associated costs are typically spread across several regions and countries.
Because of the lack of information, we were unable to calculate the relevant costs,
let alone apportion them to the different activities and countries. This is an area for fur-
ther research. But going by the observed internal rates of return to rice genetic improve-
ment that range from 18 to 182 percent in West and Central Africa (Tollens et al. 2013),
it is plausible that even in the case of Benin, the present value of benefits from grain
quality improvement is highly relative to the present value of costs. Nonetheless, we
are careful not to make broad-stroke recommendations for quality improvement
based on the relatively small welfare impacts obtained in this study.
To examine the robustness of our results, we undertake a sensitivity analysis by vary-
ing the price elasticity of demand for rice, while holding other parameters constant. We
consider 10, 20, and 30 percent increases and reductions in the price elasticity and
observe corresponding changes in CS. The results are presented in Table 6.
Generally, our model results are not very sensitive to changes in the price elasticity
of demand. For instance, a 10 percent increase in the price elasticity increases the
annual gain in CS from improvement in head rice by 2.16 percent for class 2, while
a 30 percent increase would improve CS by 6.50 percent. Likewise, with respect to
improvement in chalkiness for class 3, a 10 percent reduction in elasticity would reduce
annual gains in CS by 1.93 percent, while a 30 percent reduction would cut gains in CS
by 5.80 percent.
Table 5. Results of the Partial Equilibrium Model of Quality Improvement
Class 2 Class 3
Gain in CS per unit of rice consumed after improvement in
head rice ($)
0.10 0.10
Gain in CS per unit of rice consumed after improvement in
chalkiness ($)
0.03 0.09
Level of aggregate demand for rice after improvement in head
rice (MT)
154,836.53 107,832.59
Level of aggregate demand for rice after improvement in
chalkiness (MT)
114,010.24 102,686.62
Total annual gain in CS after improvement in head rice ($) 12,881.08 8,970.75
Total annual gain in CS after improvement in chalkiness ($) 2,809.81 7,543.43





















































































































This study uses a hedonic price model to examine market sorting in the Beninese rice
market and examines the effect of grain quality improvement on CS. It applies data
obtained from laboratory tests of grain quality traits. Controlling for, among other
things, two attributes, namely the origin and type of rice that are commonly used to
characterize the country’s consumer categories, the study has established that there
are at least three classes of consumers in the Beninese rice market, manifesting in pro-
portions of 5, 56, and 39 percent. Of the three classes, the smallest class pays the highest
price, significantly discounts parboiled rice, and prefers imported to local rice. The sec-
ond class also discounts parboiled rice but does not place a significant value on the ori-
gin of rice, whereas the third category values neither the origin nor the type of rice.
Similarly, preferences for other quality attributes vary from one class to another.
Hedonic prices obtained for head rice and chalkiness are applied to a partial equi-
librium model to determine the welfare implications of quality improvement for cate-
gories 2 and 3. The first important outcome from this exercise is the computed
elasticities of demand for rice with respect to the quantities of the two attributes.
This is especially informative because these elasticities enable breeders and private
seed companies to quickly understand how consumers will respond to grain quality
improvement. We then find that an increase in head rice and a reduction in chalkiness
autonomously lead to modest gains in consumer welfare.
These results have two important implications for upgrading rice value chains in
Benin and other African countries. First and foremost, any upgrading strategy ought
to begin by recognizing potential heterogeneity in consumer preferences for rice quality
attributes and that existing product categories may not fully capture the heterogeneity.
As demonstrated in this study, each class of consumers has a unique hedonic price
function and almost all quality attributes—head rice, grain shape, chalkiness, lightness,
cooking time, and amylose content—can be targeted for product upgrading. Therefore,
upgrading rice value chains requires information on the nature of demand or hedonic
price function of the different categories of consumers.
Second, knowledge of the impacts of quality improvement on consumer welfare is
informative for setting priorities for spending on research and development. For
instance, although our estimates are generally small on economic impact, we see that
an improvement in head rice leads to far greater benefits for consumers than an
improvement in chalkiness. Our analysis, therefore, demonstrates a straightforward
Table 6. Gain in Consumer Surplus (USD) for Different Price Elasticities of Demand
Elasticity
Improvement in head rice Improvement in chalkiness
Class 2 Class 3 Class 2 Class 3
−1.804 13,160.23 9,165.16 2,828.66 7,689.24
−1.968 13,439.38 9,359.57 2,847.50 7,835.05
−2.132 13,718.52 9,553.97 2,866.34 7,980.86
−1.476 12,601.93 8,776.35 2,790.97 7,397.63
−1.312 12,322.79 8,581.94 2,772.13 7,251.82
−1.148 12,043.64 8,387.54 2,753.28 7,106.01




















































































































application of hedonic pricing and partial equilibrium methods to evaluating priorities
for crop improvement and value chain upgrading. Currently, there are ongoing efforts
by the CGIAR Consortium to develop product profiles of mega rice varieties in Africa
in order to achieve certain development outcomes. The analysis used in this study can
be integrated in the proposed three-stage approach to product profiling. Of course, it
would be even more enlightening to consider net welfare changes by accounting for
impacts on producers.
Data Availability Statement. Data used in this study are available from the corresponding author upon
request.
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